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All politics is local and as such local incentives matter most.

Most of us do things we think will avoid pain or that we think will help us get what we want. Policymakers are no different. Understanding this helps explain the fiscal cliff action nonsense and should inform how advocates pursue their goals.

It is probably fair to say that America is united in thinking the fiscal cliff is stupid. It’s stupid metaphor for a stupid problem that shouldn’t exist to begin with. If these dingbats, most of whom appear to have learned the art of politics from Veruca Salt, just did the right thing to begin with we wouldn’t be in this mess. The challenge is that there is no abstract national political or policy "right answer” and if there were it wouldn’t matter. Congress is not a national body; it is a collection of local interests in the same room.

Policy in this country is made by a collection of elected officials from a wide range of backgrounds, from vastly different parts of the country, holding a myriad of religious beliefs, and with varying levels of intellect and relevant experience. These elected officials do not represent “America” in the abstract - the only person who can lay claim to that is the President, and since he is prevented from running for another term he can do as he pleases without caring what those who elected him think. Senators represent their specific states and Representatives their specific districts. Policymakers are elected by a specific group of people for specific reasons and tasked with specific responsibilities. Additionally, policymakers tend to reflect their constituencies, they come from and reflect the values of the communities they represent (not all the views and values of all of the constituents, but increasingly more and more of them). Policymakers are not all-seeing and all-knowing clear-eyed balancers of interests who once elected rise above the rabble and rumble; policymakers tend to be people who are like the people they are elected to represent and tend to behave that way.

As such, rather than thinking about policy in a broad national ‘what makes the most sense in the aggregate’ sense, it makes more sense to think about policymaking as a series of specific local officials making decisions based on specific local incentives. This is precisely the point made by the Washington Post’s Chris Cillizza, by Jonathan Allen in Politico, and Nate Silver in the New York Times. Politics, as the late Speaker Tip O’Neill put it, is local.

The lesson for advocates is clear:
Determine which policymakers you need to take what actions to win (find power);
Learn what power on your issue is afraid of losing and what they would like to gain (fear of loss is better;
Identify local messages that speak to that risk of loss or promise of gain;
Find local messengers who can deliver that message and to whom power will listen; and
Focus on those local efforts.

It is fair to say that the NRA could have done a better job at their press conference this morning. It’s not easy to make Code Pink look rational, but the NRA’s Wayne LaPierre managed to do just that.

LaPierre could have done any number of other more productive things this morning, including staying home and watching “Saved By The Bell” reruns. Having chosen to address the media in what promised to be part of an honest conversation about guns Mr. LaPierre could have both stayed with the NRA’s position policy position and not done Speaker Boehner the favor being the worst press conference of the morning.

Had Mr. LaPierre asked, here’s what I would have advised:

Open by saying that the NRA staff honored the national moment of silence for the victims earlier this morning, and ask everyone in the room to remember the families and communities across the country touched by gun violence. This would set a somber tone, demonstrate that the NRA is being respectful, and put the organization on the side of most Americans. Further acknowledge that Mr. LaPierre, like President Obama, responded first as a father. Again this would align Mr. LaPierre with the sentiments of the nation and put him on the same moral side as his presumed adversary.

Second, say that gun policies need to be discussed but out of the heat of a political moment. Say that he had already reached out to Vice President Biden and invited him and his task force to the NRA’s office to meet with NRA leaders and board members (this bit would have to be true). This makes the NRA an ally of solutions and also reminds folks the organization is powerful enough to invite the Vice President to them and have the offer taken seriously.

Third, note that the challenge of mass violence and shootings is complicated. It is about mental health issues, coarsening culture, violence in the media, law enforcement resources, families and communities as well as guns. This would put the NRA where most Americans are and point to other culprits; something that Mr. LaPierre tried to do, but with the finesse of a drunken hippo on ice.

Fourth, indicate it is time to look at all of America’s gun laws (again, something LaPierre did, however poorly). Suggest that all of the nation’s gun laws be examined, where they work keep them, where they need to be enforced enforce them, and where they don’ t work repeal them. This highlights that are already lots of laws on the books but shootings still happen.

Fifth, insist that the US Department of Justice undergo an internal review of its own practices to ensure that the national records are up to date and that the DoJ isn’t itself doing anything to increase gun violence. This reinforces the above point and hints at the “Fast and Furious” program, putting the Obama administration on the defensive.

Sixth, only after all of the current policies are reviewed and all the current laws are enforced, should we look at what new restrictions, if any, are needed on movies, video games, guns, and so forth. Emphasize that any solution is about America’s shared concern to keep children safe. Argue that if this debate is just about guns, America has missed a moment; this debate must be about protecting children and communities. This forces the conversation away from guns and to issues like mental health. Pointing to inherent complexity makes any single “silver bullet” (sorry) attempt at a solution less likely.

Such a statement would have put the NRA on the side of most Americans and the President, advanced all of the points that Mr. LaPierre attempted to advance (save putting more guns in schools – an idea that is stunningly absurd for so many reasons – and one that he could have supported as part of the larger solution phase of the effort, part of step six).

One wins arguments by putting issues in larger contexts with which people agree. Not by out Code Pinking Code Pink.

The metaphor of politics as chess is apt, but not for the reasons most imagine. Comparing politics and chess implies that, like chess, politics is a cerebral game of move and countermove, with the clever winner setting traps for the intellectually inferior opponent. But really, the lessons chess offers political professionals are planning and patience.

The greatest chess games of all time of course have brilliant moves and countermoves, feints and foils, and all the rest. They also have restraint. Pieces go untaken because the capture isn’t part of the strategy to achieve the ultimate goal, pieces that could be taken aren’t. The goal of chess isn’t to capture the most pieces – the goal of chess is to capture the king. The best players have a strategy going into a game, have their first eight to ten moves plotted out in advance, and then diligently and deliberately execute their plan. Sometimes the moves are bold, but they are never reckless or impulsive. The best chess players recognize opportunities exist only in the context the complete game and in relation to the ultimate goal, not in isolation.

Like the best chess players, the best campaigns develop and diligently deploy a strategy – even if that strategy means not jumping on every opportunity. Championship chess games are long; the most famous world championship in history, Fischer vs. Spassky in 1972, and ran 21 games over seven weeks (and the last game was itself 40 moves). Similarly, successful campaigns are long, have periods in which moves don’t seem to add up to tangible/visible movement, and can sometimes feel unimaginative. And like chess, sometimes in politics it is best to play for a tie. It is more fun to jump on an opportunity and easier to sell immediate action. Campaigns like that are faster, more fun to work on, and easier to get funded. But they don’t always win.

Too often candidates and advocates develop strategies and then spend their time doing whatever occurs to them next. They often write specific plans and promise not to get distracted, but then can’t resist taking the pawn that’s just sitting there. These moves are usually taken for what seem like good reasons at the time – “we have to get in the press to prove to funders we’re doing something,” or “ads can help us get noticed,” and so on. But the moves almost always take attention and scarce resources away from the point and the point is passing a bill, preventing a bill from being passed, or winning an election.

The best campaigns identify a clear goal, determine who has power over that goal, figure out what those in power find persuasive, learn from whom they find it persuasive, and do that. Everything else is just taking pawns because they happen to be there.

I recently brought on an assistant, Zoe Valentine, to help me with what is shaping up to be a tremendously busy fall. Her tasks will run from research and editing to the occasional errand running. I recruited her for the position and tracked her down on vacation to offer her the gig.

Zoe’s first task was to tell me what earpiece I should get for my phone. Far from the most glamorous thing she will ever do, but from the perspective of those who have to talk to me on the phone it was a very important assignment. Zoe’s response is a model for all assistants everywhere. She didn’t question or complain about the task, she said “ok” and did it. Within hours she emailed me not only her top recommendation with a link to a review of the product and the product’s price, but also two other options (including price) should I want something different. Zoe went further – she knew I was working out of a client’s office and told me the closest place to the office to buy the earpiece, and further said when she spoke to the people at that store they were very nice and helpful, which both made me feel more comfortable about the store and demonstrated that she did more than poke around the internet for a few minutes.

Zoe did what I asked and anticipated the questions I would have (how much does it cost? Where can I get one? What if I don’t like it and want something else?).

A former colleague once said that some of the best advice he got as an intern was that if you’re asked to get a fork for the boss act as if the fate of the free world hung on that fork. The earpiece and fork matter because if you prove to me you can do the little stuff well and thoroughly then I am more likely to trust you with the big stuff. If you do a less than great (or worse, less than adequate) job with the basics then the big stuff is out of the question.

"I knew [Senator Rob Portman – R, Ohio] had a connection to New Hampshire. He went to Dartmouth, and so I called to see if he would be interested. And he is,".

Anyone reading this could have said the above. Making a personal connection to an elected official is often a critical way to begin a conversation about an issue (even a connection as tenuous as he happened to go to college in your home state). That it was said by US Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) in a National Public Radio story on Senator Portman is a reminder of how important that personal connection is. Senator Shaheen approached Senator Portman about co-sponsoring legislation supporting energy efficiency. She didn’t speak to him senator-to-senator or lead with climate change, strains to the national energy grid, costs to consumers, or any of the other reasons energy efficiency is important – she led with a home-state connection. She said “we have something personal in common, can we talk about a policy concern we might also have in common?”

Politics creates policy, and politics is about relationships. Creating policy requires building relationships. Relationships can be built on shared data, but more often than not relationships are built on shared experience, shared interests, or shared values. Because policy is made by people the best advocates treat policymakers as people first and policymakers second. Senator Shaheen started a conversation about energy efficiency with a conversation about Dartmouth College, it was a common ground, a personal connection, a “I’m like you, you’re like me” moment that fostered the conversation about energy efficiency legislation.

The best advocates find that piece of common ground first, and bring in the policies second.

The death of Steven Covey offers a chance to note the seven habits of highly effective advocacy campaigns. Covey, of course, was the author of The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People (as well as The Eighth Habit and The Third Alternative). His habits are as applicable to advocacy campaigns as they are to individuals.

Be Proactive. Figure out what you can change, and change it. The most successful advocacy campaigns figure out where they can advance their issue, and then work on advancing it. Tilting at windmills or lamenting the failures of mainstream media (or Congress, or funders, or whatever) doesn’t help you succeed.

Begin with the End in Mind. Figure out what success looks like and work back to where you are now. A clear goal allows a clear plan to achieve it. The fuzzier the goal the fuzzier the plan and the harder it is to succeed (in part because if you don’t know what success looks like you won’t know it if you get it).

Put First Things First. Success requires prioritization and not doing everything. If a tactic or idea doesn’t advance your plan and move you toward your goal, don’t do it.

Think Win-Win. Politics is often seen as a zero-sum game with “winning” as compromise (which is more like tie-tie than win-win, if everyone is kissing their cousin everyone is just creeped out). The best advocates figure out ways to advance their goals and the goals of those who need to be persuaded (or other advocates, consultants, the media, etc.) at the same time. The best advocates figure out how their success can also be the success of others.

Seek First to Understand, then to Be Understood. The best advocates invest in understanding how and why their opponents disagree – not with an eye to winning the argument, but with the intent of understanding. Really understanding where others are coming from makes it far more likely you will be able to advance your shared goals. You may also change your mind, and at the very least you will have a better understanding of your own position.

Synergize. Turns out Covey is to blame for this awful word. That aside, the idea is good. Find ways to combine forces to win, think the children’s story Stone Soup.

Sharpen the Saw. The best advocates constantly find ways to refresh and renew themselves, and they also realize they are not their work. The best advocacy campaigns similarly draw on the world around them for energy and ideas. Art matters for advocates and campaigns, mini-golf matters (who’s in?), getting out of the little tunnel of whatever you’re doing matters – and it helps you win.

Conduct a pre-mortem before committing to a campaign or communications plan. Imagine your organization a year into the plan’s implementation and assume the effort was a disaster and explain why the effort failed. This idea, taken from Thinking Fast and Slow by Nobel Prize winning economist Daniel Kahneman (who gives credit to Gary Klein), can help avoid needless mistakes and strengthen your effort.

Most of us fall ,into patterns of thinking; we have approaches or notions we prefer and we easily find evidence of our wisdom wherever we turn. When we propose a strategy or approach we easily see the path to our success – we will issue report ‘A’ which will lead reporter ‘B’ to write a story which will help encourage oped columnist ‘C’ to write in our favor which will help promote our solution ‘D’ sort of thing. We may, of course, be right. But maybe not. It is worth taking a few minutes to imagine failure and figure out what went wrong. For example, was reporter ‘B’ covering other issues? Did his or her editor not like the topic or piece? Was the issue simply not newsworthy given everything else going on? What if that was the wrong reporter? Did the policymaker(s) whose actions are needed not care about the reporter, oped writer, or online action?

Issue campaigns are tremendously difficult to win if you do everything right – it is worth spending a few minutes checking your assumptions and making appropriate adjustments to increase the odds of your success.

A few quick somewhat disconnected thoughts on the Supreme Court’s ruling on the Affordable Care Act:

A reporter for the POTUS station on XM/Sirius radio covering the protesters at the Supreme Court said the crowd was getting so large there wasn’t any room for the belly-dancers. Belly Dancers for Single Payer joined countless others to protest in front of the Supreme Court yesterday. I can’t help but wonder why. First, by the time the ruling is read, the decision has been made so if there is a persuasive impact to tri-cornered hats and bangled ankles they have to come earlier in the process. Second, tri-cornered hats and bangled ankles have no persuasive impact. It’s not as if Chief Justice Roberts was looking out his office window thinking “those are some sharp hats but those belly dancers may be on to something.”

The ruling is barely 24 hours old and I’m already tired of it. From my perspective the health care reform debate was like puberty – I like the outcome but have no interest in going through it again. For most Americans this debate is over, and every time Congressman Cantor brings it up (he’s scheduled another vote on in a couple of weeks) people say “there they go again, we don’t have jobs and those idiots continue to resurrect a dead horse just so they can beat to death again.” Yesterday Congressman Rob Andrews (D-NJ) was asked by a radio host how often he gets asked about the Affordable Care Act when he goes home; the reply was along the lines of: 'never - people care about jobs, the economy and home prices.' As someone who supports the bill I encourage Mr. Cantor to vote to repeal it once a week until the election. Because every time he does Mr. Andrews will ask “why aren’t you voting on the President’s jobs bill?” Pointless votes are obvious political stunts, and Americans hate political stunts.

The ruling is the best of all possible outcomes for Republicans. The Supreme Court upheld the Constitutionality of a Republican idea that they can also use to attack President Obama. This is the very definition of having your cake and eating it too. Further Chief Justice Roberts gave Republicans the strongest talking point ever: taxes. My advice to Republicans is to stop talking about health care and to use the word “tax” as often as possible. For example, “the Chief Justice agreed with what we’ve been saying all along, this is a tax. It is the largest tax hike in history. This is a tax on the rich, a tax on the poor, and a tax on the middle class. This is a tax on Americans the President promised to soak and it is a tax on Americans the President promised to protect. If it collects like a tax, and if it spends like a tax, it’s a tax. And if there’s one thing Americans don’t need it’s another tax.”

As a former college debater I am tempted to walk through Prof. Jacqueline Stevens’ rant against National Science Foundation funding of political science argument by painful argument. Others have taken this route already (see here for example). Thanks to the NSF funded quantitative research done by political scientist Prof. Frank Baumgartner I know such attempts are rarely effective.

A better approach is to recognize that issues can be considered from a number of different, and non-contradictory, positions. The initial position that takes root is most likely to determine policy outcomes. Using this approach Prof. Baumgartner and his colleagues explained the shift in the national death penalty debate and predicted its ongoing demise in a book they published several years ago. This approach speaks to the power of initial frames for the debate, and suggests that the way in to an argument is more important than specific support that follows – an argument recently extended by Prof. Stevens’ colleagues at Northwestern in their paper A Source of Bias in Public Opinion Stability. (the work was supported by Northwestern’s Applied Quantitative Methods Workshop).

As such, rather than wade through Prof. Stevens’ claims I would suggest she is providing the wrong answer to the wrong question. She assumes that specific prediction is the point of political science – as if rigorous research into the complexity of political systems is mean to give policymakers a collective sore knee when change is coming.

From where I sit as a political practitioner that’s not the point. I rely on quantitative and qualitative political science to better understand, and help my clients take advantage of, the political system. For example, I ran an organization that helped re-frame the national death penalty debate in a way that is leading to its demise. Our approach was informed by political science research and ultimately led to Prof. Baumgartner’s book mentioned above. Those who read political science literature are not surprised by the rise of “Super PACs” and the failure of campaign finance schemes to get money out of politics, are not surprised that health care companies are promising to keep popular reforms in the Affordable Care Act regardless of what the Supreme Court does, and are surely not surprised that popular political pundits are often wrong.

I use political science research the way that economists, baseball managers, and doctors use research in their fields - to check my assumptions and biases, to better understand the situation at hand, and to help inform how I should therefore act.

NSF funded quantitative political science, as well as qualitative political science, political theory, philosophy, communications theory, and rhetorical theory have helped me and my clients achieve a number of important wins over the years and have helped avoid a lot of pitfalls (I have a lot of “don’t do that” conversations). To suggest that NSF funds can’t predict the date of a coup or the winner of the next World Cup is to miss the point.

Last week I wrote about a recent survey of advocates and Congressional staff as reported in Politico. The survey found that both lobbyists and advocates consider “credible, reliable information” critical in advocacy.

That, apparently, is where the agreement ends. According to the Politico piece, lobbyists (not surprisingly) report their efforts have a significant effect on Congressional actions. Congressional staffs, who are loathe to admit to researchers (let along themselves) that they are empty intellectual and political vessels waiting to be filled with talking points, report that lobbyists do not have a significant effect on their behavior.

Both are, of course, right.

The research found what anyone who has ever set foot in a Congressional office knows – there is way too much to think about and way too little time to think about it. Policymakers and staff are drowning in information. Most get well in excess of 100 emails a day, field countless calls (and ignore countless more), attend endless meetings and briefings, and are deluged with paper. In addition to information staff are drowning in the sounds of phones ringing, other peoples’ conversations, and the TV (usually tuned to the floor of the House or Senate, CNN or Fox News – except during recess when ESPN is on).

In this environment, to steal a line from Iyengar and Kinder lobbyists don’t tell staff what to think, but rather what to think about. There is an agenda setting function of advocacy. Advocates are able to say “of all the stuff you could think about, you should think about this, and you should think about it in this context, with this set of impacts, and therefore act in this way.” Good advocates move an issue to the top of the pile, and do so in a way that makes the advocate’s solution the preferred option for the policymaker. They are able to say “this is something that matters to your boss’s constituents, it goes to the heart of what he believes in and why he ran for Congress, and intervening on the issue in the way I suggest will not only fix the problem but will result in positive political results.”

Attention is the most precious commodity a policymaker has. Attention is zero-sum, there are a limited number of things a person can think about or deal with; attention paid to issue A is attention not paid to issues B-Z. Further, issue A can be considered from angles 1-7. By saying “issue A matters from angle 3 (and thus not only do issues B-Z not matter but angles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 don’t matter)” an advocate is exercising tremendous power.

That a lobbyist can rarely change a policymaker’s mind is of course true; once taken a position is difficult to change. But to suggest that a failure to change a mind is a failure of advocacy is to seriously miss the boat.