Writing a syllabus forces one to remember what they once learned but could stand to be reminded of. In preparing a graduate course in strategic communication at George Washington University, I have been reminded that while people are not rational (in the homo economus sense of the word), they’re (our) behavior usually makes sense. As noted political scientist Bryan Jones put, “People making choices are intendedly rational. They want to make rational decisions, but they cannot always do so.” (“Bounded Rationality” Annual Review of Political Science, 1999, pp. 297-321).
Traditional rational actor theory posits that we’re perfect Nash machines, making reasoned choices based on an objective view of options and outcomes. These preferences do not change based on situational constraints or nuances of description. Unfortunately this theory does not explain actual political behavior very well. As Jones puts it, “There is no longer any doubt about the weight of the scientific evidence; the expected-utility model of economic and political decision making is not sustainable empirically.”
Instead, according to Jones and others, people are boundedly rational. Jones writes, “Like comprehensive rationality, bounded rationality assumes that actors are goal-oriented, but bounded rationality takes into account the cognitive limitations of decision makers in attempting to achieve those goals.”
A key insight offered by those who study bounded rationality (and the connection between this post and this blog) is that by focusing on bounded rationality, theorists focus on the decision maker rather than the information. If decision makers aren’t all running iterative n person games in their heads in the face of all political situations, then what are they doing?
Answering this question is critical for advocates. Successful persuasion is not a matter of dumping data on a desk and waiting for policymakers to locate optimal outcomes. Yet that is what a lot of advocates do, they compile information and send it out in a report and assume that will get the outcomes they desire. When that approach fails (as it generally does) the advocates either repeat themselves louder and more slowly, or they write the policymaker off as irrational.
A better approach is to identify the constraints under which a decision maker operates, to get a grip on how the decision maker constructs their choices. Most of us most of the time behave in ways that make sense to us; “it seemed like a good idea at the time” is usually an accurate reply to “why did you do take that idiotic action?”
These boundedly rational decisions are informed by framing (Kahneman and Tversky’s famous experiments describing hypothetical responses to outbreaks of disease), time constraints, institutional loyalty, and a host of other factors – all of which make sense to the decision maker when then decision is made.
Smart advocates learn what makes sense to the decision makers they need to reach – and reach them there.
